This paper is a presentation of a status qu stionis, to wit of the problem of the interpretability logic of all reasonable arithmetical theories. We present both the arithmetical side and the modal side of the question.
Introduction
What challenges does the future have in store for us? When talking provability and interpretability logic, we are in the happy position of being able to give a pretty de nite answer. Three great problems is what we are facing. The rst |studied by R . V erbrugge and A. Berarducci . The third problem, the problem explained in this paper, is the problem of the interpretability logic of all reasonable arithmetical theories.
In this article, the current status of the problem will be presented. The paper provides the necessary de nitions and a detailed explanation of the latest conjecture. It will be made evident that the problem is a good problem in that it intertwines modal and arithmetical ideas.
We did our best to make this exposition accessible to all readers with a modicum of mathematical sophistication.
What is an Interpretation?
The interpretations we are interested in are relative interpretations in the sense of Tarski, Mostwoski and Robinson (see 22] ). Consider theories U with language L U and T with language L T . For the moment w e assume that L U is a relational language. An interpretation K of U in T is given by a pair h (x) F i. Here (x) is an L T -formula representing the domain of the interpretation. 1 F is a mapping that associates to each relation symbol R of L U with arity n an L Tformula F(R)(x 1 x n ). Here x 1 : : : x n are suitably chosen free variables. We translate the formulas of L U to the formulas of L T as follows:
K(R(y 1 y n )) := F(R)(y 1 y n ), ( We do not demand that identity is translated as identity.)
K commutes with the propositional connectives, K(8y A ) : = 8y ( (y) ! K (A)), K(9y A ) : = 9y ( (y)^K(A)),
There are some tri ing details |e.g. about avoiding variable clashes| that we ignore here. In case L U contains functionsymbols,we rst apply the usual algorithm to eliminate functionsymbols to translate L U to a corresponding relational language and then we apply the translation sketched above. (For an attempt to get all the details right, see 29] .) Finally, w e demand of interpretations that for all sentences A which are universal closures of axioms of U, w e h a ve TK (A).
We will write K : T U for K is an interpretation of U in T. An alternative notation, which is more suitable if we want to study the category of interpretations, is U K ;! T. We write T U, f o r K : T U, for some K.
Interpretations are used for various purposes: to prove relative consistency, conservation results and undecidability results. The syntactical character of interpretations has the obvious advantage that it allows us to convert proofs of the interpreted theory in an e cient w ay i n to proofs of the interpreting theory. Examples of relative i n terpretations are e.g. the interpretation of arithmetic in set-theory, the interpretation of elementary syntax in arithmetic, the interpretation of PA + incon(PA) i n PA.
Let's forget, for a brief moment, about interpretations. Let's think about e.g. the construction of a model of two dimensional elliptic space in Euclidean three dimensional space. This is a construction inside the standard model of Euclidean geometry, w h i c h is modulo isomorphism the unique model of the second order version of three dimensional Euclidean geometry, of (modulo isomorphism) the standard model of two dimensional elliptic geometry. We construct this model by stipulating that`point' in the new sense will be line through a given point 2 , line' in the new sense is plane through the given point,`incidence of point a n d line' is the line representing the point is in the plane representing the line, e t c . If you inspect the construction, you will see that it just uses the resources of the rst order theory of three dimensional Euclidean geometry. Thus it provides a uniform way of transforming models of ( rst order) three dimensional Euclidean geometry into models of ( rst order) two dimensional elliptic geometry. A still closer inspection shows that our construction can be viewed as a purely syntactical transformation. It provides a relative i n terpretation of ( rst order) two dimensional elliptic geometry in ( rst order) three dimensional Euclidean geometry.
We can capture the relation of interpretations and model constructions as follows. Let Mod(V ) be the class of models of a theory V . An interpretation K of U in T provides a uniform way to build internal models of U inside models of T. Thus K provides us with a function, say Mod(K), from Mod(T ) t o Mod(U).
Thus de ned Mod is a contravariant functor from Theory, the category of theories and interpretations, to Class, the category of de nable classes and de nable functions between classes. T h e i d e a o f a n i n terpretation as an`internal model given in a uniform way' is an important heuristic in thinking about interpretations: the mind craves reality and visualisation rather than syntax. We will exploit this heuristic in what follows. E.g. we will speak about one interpretation K being an end-extension of another one M, meaning that in every model the internal model associated to K is an end-extension of the internal model of M in a uniform way.
So What's Reasonable?
We will be interested in interpretability of reasonable arithmetical theories. More speci cally we will be interested in what such theories have t o s a y a b o u t interpretability in these theories themselves. So what are reasonable arithmetical theories? A theory, for our present purposes, is a predicate logical theory axiomatized by axioms in an axiom set that is given by arithmetical formula . Unless stated otherwise we assume that is simple, say a predicate corresponding with a class that is decidable by a p-time algorithm. Note that our speci cation makes theory an intensional notion, since we consider theories also from the point o f v i e w o f theories: and may specify the same axiom set, but a theory U thinking about T and T need not be aware of that.
Arithmetical' has a primary and a secondary meaning. In the primary meaning an arithmetical theory is an extension of Robinson's Arithmetic Q in the usual language of arithmetic with 0, S, + and . (We will often use instead of .) In the secondary meaning, an arithmetical theory is a pair hT N i , w h e r e N : T Q. In other words an arithmetical theory is a theory with designated predicates representing the natural numbers, representing zero, etc.
e.g. hZF N i , w h e r e N is the usual set-theoretical representation of the natural numbers, is an arithmetical theory. The intended meaning of arithmetical theory in this paper is the secondary one.
The caution concerning the explicit designation of the natural numbers is necessary, since not all interpretations of number theory are provably isomorphic in a given theory. Thus the following three statements are equally true.
1. con(ZF) is independent o f GB (= G odel-Bernays Set Theory). 2. GB proves con(ZF).
3. GB proves : con(ZF).
Here con(ZF) abbreviates a xed arithmetical sentence, but we vary, in the examples, the designated set of natural numbers. The correct formulation of our statements is: Rather than viewing the possibility o f h a ving di erent sets of numbers as a nuisance, we will make grateful use of it by s w i t c hing between choices of what the numbers'are.
There is some arbitrariness in our singling out arithmetic as the thing we are interested in, especially since representations of syntax play such a large role in G odelean metamathematics. We could as have well decided to speak about syntactical theories, counting e.g. hPA S ias a syntactical theory, where S is a designated interpretation of some reasonable theory of elementary syntax.
There are two reasons we will make the traditional choice to speak about arithmetic: rst simply because it is the traditional choice |changing it will cause confusion|, secondly the methodology of de nable cuts is easier to understand in the context of arithmetic.
What is reasonable? It means at least: strong enough to verify the minimal principles we a r e i n terested in. Take, e.g. the principle that tells us that if something is provable, then it's provable that it's provable. To v erify the principle in the obvious way, w e n e e d 0 -induction, plus the totality of the function ! 1 , where ! 1 (x) = 2 (log 2 x) 2 . This principle is called 1 The second demand that we pose, has to do with the coherence of the theories. Given two theories T U , w e could take a disjoint union T U in such a way that the T-and the U-objects have no recognizable interaction at all. So if our numbers are`con ned in' T, they will not be able to`interact' in any w ay with the U-part. What we demand is that our theory is sequential: it should contain (in the sense of interpretability) a theory of sequences of all objects the theory can talk about. Here the lengths length( ) and projections ( ) i are taken from an initial segment of the designated numbers. Sequentiality is important to make e.g. the construction of partial truthpredicates possible. For more on sequentiality, see e.g. 10] .
The third demand is not really a demand but a programmatic point. We should keep the answer to the question what a reasonable theory is, somewhat inde nite. The class of reasonable theories is that class of theories that allows a beautiful answer to the question what the interpretability logic of all reasonable theories is. E.g. it could happen that only the theories that contain the axiom that exponentiation is total have a nice logic. Well, in that case we say that those theories are the reasonable ones.
Approaches to Interpretability
What could the metamathematical study of interpretability a n d i n terpretations look like? O n e i d e a i s t o s t u d y degrees of interpretability. Interpretability yields a partial preorder on theories. Dividing the associated equivalence relation out we get a degree-theory. Degree-theory has been studied by P. Lindstr om and C. Bennet (see e.g. 14] and 2]) and by V. Svejdar (see 21] ). The work on degrees was very fruitful as a generator of methods and techniques. Some of these techniques have been adapted for application in interpretability logic.
We feel that it could be very fruitful to extend the degree-theoretic approach to the study of suitable categories of interpretations. The more expressive category-theoretical language might be better suited to express certain basic insights concerning interpretability. There were some attempts to initiate such a study, but these attempts did yield less than satisfactory results. Some further experimentation is needed to isolate the right categories.
The approach t o i n terpretability that is the focus of this paper is the modal study of interpretability. 3 The modal language has the advantage of expressiveness, but there are costs. First modal logic is about`propositions' not about theories. This means that we cannot directly study the relations K : T U or even T U. What we study is the relation A T B, w h i c h is de ned as follows:
A T B :, (T + A) (T + B). Here T is the base theory. We speak of (sentential) interpretability over T.
Secondly, we are interested in iterating the modal connectives. We want to allow things like ( A B) C. This means that our research is restricted to base theories T that have su cient coding ability to formalize a decent amount o f reasoning concerning interpretations. This restriction is substantial since lots of important i n terpretations fall outside the scope of our investigation. If we p a y the costs, there are some gains.
1. We have a modal language that is rich enough to articulate both the incompleteness theorems and the model existence lemma, which is the heart of the completeness theorem. 2. Some substantial reasoning concerning interpretability can be executed in this modal logic. 3. The Kripke model theory of the logic is highly interesting qua modal logic. 4. The arithmetical side of the study involves substantial arithmetical insights. As we will see, in an indirect way, our logic can talk about large and small numbers.
Before we introduce the modal logics, we interpolate a brief introduction to some salient arithmetical facts.
2 Parvulae Arithmeticae
Coding
Since the function ! 1 = x:2 (log 2 x) 2 is present in our basic system of arithmetic Basic, w e h a ve p-time computable functions available. Having these, arithmetization of syntax becomes a piece of cake. The most obvious g odelnumberingof strings in a given alphabet is also the best one. We e n umerate rst the strings of length 0, then the strings of length 1, and so on. The strings of the same length we order alphabetically. We a s s i g n t o e a c h string as g odelnumber simply its ordernumber in the sequence so obtained. It turns out, using a trick d u e t o Smullyan, that operations on strings like concatenation can be easily arithmetically represented under this coding. An important insight is the elementary fact that the g odelnumber of a string is of order A length( ) , where A is the cardinality of the alphabet. We will code syntactical elements, like formulas and proofs, by writing them out and then taking the code of the resulting string.
We will write 2 T A for the arithmetization of T proves A and A T B for the arithmetization of T + A interprets T + B. If A contains a free variable x, 2 T A is the arithmetization of the result of substituting the numeral of x in A for \x" i s p r ovable in T'. Further conventions are similar.
E cient Numerals
It is de nitely not a good idea to represent the number n by the numeral n z }| { S S 0. The g odelnumber of this numeral will be of order 2 cn , for a xed constant c. So the function sending a number to the code of its numeral will be exponential. Exponentiation is not generally available in Basic. Hence we will use binary numerals instead. These are de ned by num(0) := 0, num(2n + 1 ) : = S(SS0 num(n)), num(2n + 2 ) := SS0 num(n + 1 ) . This representation has the happy consequence that the g odelnumber of the numeral of n is of order 2 c log 2 n , i.e. n k , for some xed standard k.
Numbers Large and Small
We h a ve to face the basic fact that we are going to use theories that do not have full induction. Note that also quite strong theories may l a c k full induction, e.g. hGB N i . Thus, in our theories, it may happen that we h a ve de nable sets of numbers containing 0 and closed under successor such that the theory doesn't think this set contains all (designated) numbers. In some cases the theory will even positively know this set does not contain all numbers. Such de nable sets of numbers, closed under successor but not necessarily containing all designated numbers, play an important role in the metamathematical study of arithmetics.
For many purposes it is convenient to put stronger demands on these sets: we ask that they are de nable cuts. Let hT N i be an arithmetical theory. Here N = h F i. We will sometimes write`x 2 I' f o r I x '.
Using a wonderful trick i n vented by S o l o vay ( 2 0 ]), we can always`shorten' a de nable set of numbers, T-provably closed under successor to a T-cut. Cuts can be considered as`notions of smallness': the numbers inside the cut arè small', the ones above it`big'. We will consider cuts themselves as interpretations of arithmetic, confusing the cut I with the interpretation hI F i, where F is the interpretation function associated with N. It is easy to see that hI F i is indeed an interpretation.
From this point on, we will often suppress the designated cut N, writing as if N were the identity interpretation.
A startling fact about cuts is the outside big, inside small principle. Even if T may fail to believe t h a t e v ery numberisintheT -cut I, w e d o h a ve:
The point is that we can have big proofs showing that big numbers are small. Here is a somewhat more elaborate proofsketch.
Proof of 2.1. We reason informally in T. Let be a (standard) proof of 8x (x 2 I ! S(SS0 x) 2 I). We convert a proof of n 2 I into a proof of S(SS0 n) 2 I as follows. 8E n 2 I ! S(SS0 n) 2 I ! E S(SS0 n) 2 I Similarly we convert a proof of n 2 I into a proof of (S S0 n) 2 I. Clearly a proof of n 2 I will use in the order of log 2 n steps. The numb e r o f s y m b o l s i n a s t e p o f the proof can be estimated by a log 2 n + b for xed standard numbers a and b. The number of symbols in the proof will be estimated by: log 2 n (a log 2 n + b). Let c := a + b. We can replace our estimate by: c (log 2 (n + 2 ) ) 2 . So the size of the G odelnumber of the proof will be estimated by 2 c (log 2 (n+2)) 2 = ( ! 1 (n+ 2 ) ) c . The function x:(! 1 (x + 2)) c is present i n Basic. Here it is. There is a T-cut I such t h a t t h e U-numbers as viewed via K are an end-extension of I.
The argument for Pudl ak's theorem is a re nement of the usual argument sketched above: where we lack induction, we compensate by switching to a smaller cut.
A Closer Look
To convince the reader that the statement of Pudl ak's theorem makes sense, we spell out the result in the pedantic mode. Remember that we assumed that T was really hT N i and U was really hU Mi. The language of interpretability logic, L int , is the language of modal propositional logic extended with a binary modal operator . We read A B as: A interprets B. We will write 3A as an abbreviation of :2:.
Let U be a reasonable arithmetical theory. An interpretation (:) of L int into U maps the atoms on sentences of L U , commutes with the propositional connectives and satis es: (2A) := 2 U A and (A B) := A U B . We study the interpretability principles valid in theories U, asking ourselves for which C in the modal language we h a ve U`C , for all (:) and asking ourselves which principles are valid in all reasonable theories. The set of principles valid in U is called Il(U). The set of principles valid in all reasonable theories will be called Il(all). 4 We i n troduce the basic modal logic IL. The principles of this logic are arithmetically sound for a wide class of theories and for various interpretations of its main connective . 5 The theory is arithmetically incomplete for all known arithmetical interpretations. The motivation for studying this speci c set of axioms comes from its modal simplicity and elegance.
IL is the smallest logic in L int containing the tautologies of propositional logic, closed under modus ponens and the following rules. (A principle is just a rule with empty a n tecedent.) Here is a sample of IL-reasoning. We prove:`A (A^2: A). First, by L1-4, w e can derive, taking the contraposition of L4:`3A ! 3(A^2: A). So, by L1 and J1, w e n d : 3A 3 (A^2: A). Applying J5 and J2, w e get: (a) 3A (A^2: A). We also have, by L1 and J1: (b)`A ((A^2: A) _ 3A) 4 For the modal language restricted to the unary connective > A in combination with 2, the problem of the interpretability logic of all theories has been solved by Maarten de Rijke, see his 9]. 5 We can also interpret as partial conservativity w.r.t. a suitable class of formulas.
and (c):`(A^2: A) (A^2: A). Applying J3 and J2 to (a), (b) and (c) we
arrive at the desired result.
Putting > for A in the principle we just derived, we see that it follows that one can construct, in a uniform way, inside every model of a given arithmetical theory T an internal model of T + incon(T ). It is a remarkable fact that L3 is doubly redundant in IL. By a clever argument, due to Dick de Jongh, we can derive L3 from L1,2,4. However this redundancy is not arithmetically helpful, since the usual arithmetical veri cation of L ob's axiom L4 uses the validity of L3. 6 The second way is to derive L3 from J5 and J4. The striking thing about this alternative proof is that it provides a really di erent way t o obtain a T-proof of 2 T A from a T-proof of A. 
The Arithmetical

Veri cation of J1
The validity o f J1 is witnessed by the identity i n terpretation ID.
Veri cation of J2 If K : A T B and M : B T C, t h e n ( M K ) : A T C. 6 We can derive L4 without using L3 by e m p l o ying a surprising argument of Kreisel (presented in 19]). However, this argument includes the veri cation of J5.
7 Andr e v an Kooy s h o wed in his masters thesis (Department of Philosophy, U t r e c ht University) that for nitely axiomatized theories in a relational language one can make the trans- 
Veri cation of J5
J5 is the interpretation existence lemma. It is the syntactical realization of the Henkin model existence lemma. Inspecting the usual proof of the model existence lemma, one sees that it involves the construction of a set of sentences describing a model. This set can as well be viewed as describing an interpretation. The set is constructed as a path in a binary tree. This path is described by a 0 2 -predicate. The desired properties of the set of sentences are veri ed using induction. Thus the whole argument can easily be veri ed in PA. The construction can be executed in almost any arithmetical theory by compensating for the lack of induction by switching to de nable cuts. The Principle M 0
The next principle that was discovered is the principle M 0 .
Here is the arithmetical veri cation. Reason in T. Suppose K : A T B. Let J be the cut of the T +A-numbers, which is isomorphic to an initial segment o f t h e T + B-numbers viewed via K. As above, we m a y assume J to be a T-cut. We have 2 T (2 T C ! 2 T 2 J T C) and, hence, 2 T ((3 T A^2 T C) ! 3 T (A^2 J T C)). It follows that:
T A^2 J T A T B^2 T C The last step, is witnessed by K, using the fact that K is an end-extension of J and the upwards persistence of We can view P 0 as a`P-i ed' version of J5. F i r s t n o t e t h a t w e can rewrite J5 as the equivalent: `A 3 B ! A B
We g e t P 0 , b y putting a box in front of the consequent.
We can now frame a new conjecture: ILW P 0 ? = Il(all). . An L-model is a triple hW R i where hW R i is an L-frame and is a forcing relation which c o m m utes in the usual way with the connectives (w A^B , w A and w B, etc.) and, moreover, w 2A , 8v (wRv ) v A). An IL-frame or Veltman frame is a triple hW R fS w j w 2 Wgi such that:
1. hW R i is an L-frame. 2. S w w" w" (w" := fx 2 W j wRxg). Veltman semantics is designed so that IL is sound and complete with respect to it.
Frames
Consider a frame F = hW R fS w j w 2 Wgi. We de ne:
F j = A :, 8 w2W 8 ( is a forcing relation on F ) w A). F is an ILW-frame if, for any x, R S x is conversely well-founded. Here u(R S x )v if, for some w, uRwS x v. F is an an ILM 0 -frame if xRyRzS x uRv ) yRv. F is an ILW -frame if it is both an ILW and an ILM 0 -frame. F is an ILM-frame if yS x zRu) yRu. F is an ILP-frame if xRyRzS x u ) zS y u. We h a ve the following correspondences: F is an ILW-frame, an ILM 0 -frame, an ILW -frame, an ILM-frame, an ILP-frame if, respectively, F j = W, F j = M 0 , F j = W , F j = M, F j = P.
Completeness Results
The During fall of 1998, the progress in developing the modal completeness proof of ILM 0 stagnated. It was thought that, perhaps, it would simplify things if we could strengthen the logic. Albert Visser tried to strengthen the frame condition of ILM 0 to arrive at a stronger principle. Remember that the frame condition of ILM 0 is: xRyRzS x uRv ! yRv. Instead of demanding an R-relation between x and v, one can demand an S yconnection between z and v. If we have zS y v, we must also have yRv, so indeed this move results in strengthening the frame condition. A corresponding principle turns out to be P 0 . The proof makes essential use of IL set -models which are a re nement o f V eltman models, due to Dick de Jongh. All logics are also sound w.r.t. the IL set -models, but more distinctions between principles become apparent. The main idea is that S-relations don't run to a single world but to a set of worlds. More details can be found in 13].
The real surprise was that the principle P 0 |which came from purely modal considerations| is valid in any reasonable arithmetical theory and hence should be in the core logic Il(all).
New Principles by Modal Re nements
If we are looking for principles in Il(all), we k n o w for sure that they should be both in ILP and in ILM. A priori, there is an in nite search space but, Veltman models provide pretty good guidance in this quest. We shall make a convention on visualizing frame conditions. First, we do not represent all the relations in the pictures. If aRb and bRc are drawn, we will rather not draw the aRc that is dictated by transivity. So by a picture we actually mean its closure w.r.t. the closure conditions for Veltman models. Secondly, t h e R-relations will be drawn as straight lines and the S-relations as curved lines. A modal principle in Il(all) should hold on all ILM-and ILP-frames. Consequently the frame condition of this principle should hold in both frame classes too. This was, of course, the case for all the principles considered so far. For example in both ILM-frames and ILP-frames we have t h a t R S x is conversely well founded. And this was precisely the frame condition of W, a principle that holds in any reasonable arithmetical theory.
We can use the pictorial heuristic to guess new principles. The search s p a c e for new principles is thus con ned to principles whose corresponding frame conditions are shared consequences of both the respective frame conditions of P and M. An example clari es this concept. 
Two Questions
We end our paper by formulating two questions of more restricted scope than our great problem.
Problem 1
The logic Il(all) is in the intersection of ILM and ILP. But it cannot be equal to this system since e.g. the principle A 3 B ! 2(A 3 B) w h i c h i s i n the intersection, is not generally valid. A proof of this fact is given in 29]. The proof employs a heavy result due to Shavrukov, see ( 18] ). Is there a more direct and more perspicuous proof of this fact?
Problem 2
Is the principle A B ! (3A^22C) (B^2C) arithmetically valid? It is certainly in ILM and ILP and thus valid both in essentially re exive a n d in nitely axiomatized reasonable arithmetical theories. Moreover it can be shown to be valid for I 0 + B 1 + 1 . Yet it is hard to see why it should be generally valid. In fact we conjecture that it is not.
